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INTRODUCTION
Anthony Comstock's tattered old banner, "MORALS,.Not Art or Literature," has
been taken out of moth balls and various "legions" have revived his crusade against
vice. Until quite recently this onslaught against sin appeared somewhat quixotic and
what victory was obtained before council or legislature was nullified by the Supreme
Court's civil libertarian preference for freedom of expression over censorship in the
name of public morality.' During the past twenty years the continuing warfare be-
tween the resolute and the dissolute has become intensified by the emergence of well-
organized pressure groups2 which have enlisted on either side to fight the battle in
several theaters of operation. Whether the "Comstock load" is pure silver or a more
mercurial metal-heavy and unbearable-has been assayed by many courts and
assemblies. The "load" left by Anthony Comstock is being weighed and an uneasy
balance is being struck between the important values of the security of public decency
and morality and freedom of expression. A compromise is being effected and neither
value has subjected the other to terms of unconditional surrender despite the in-
transigence of extremists on each side.
I See for example Burslyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Superior Filn, Inc. v. Department of
Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); and Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
2 Perhaps the most active and vocal pressure group advancing the cause for censorship is the
National Organization for Decent Literature, an unofficial body formed in 1938 by the Roman
Catholic hierarchy, which is dedicated to the task of arousing public opinion against what it regards
as objectionable matter, and employs methods of persuasion, pressure, and boycott. The leading
spokesman for those who are opposed to obscenity laws or who would restrict their scope to a narrow
area, is the American Civil Liberties Union and its affiliates. Intervention in litigated cases has been
its principal technique.
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There have been several important battles or skirmishes in this contest. By coinci-
dence, 1857 and 1957 are significant dates. In 1857, Parliament enacted Lord Camp-
bell's Act,3 which authorized a magistrate or justice of the peace to order the de-
struction of material found to be "obscene" and in 1957 the Supreme Court celebrated
the centennial by upholding a similar New York statute4 which the dissenting Chief
Justice describing as savoring "too much of book burning." For good measure, the
Comstock Act was held not to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.5 Although the
latter verdict placed the Supreme Court-or at least its majority-on the side of the
angels, it may prove to be a costly victory as the "disarming generalizations" of the
majority opinion may produce a multiplicity of litigation and a spate of judicial
review.6
It may be of some interest to put these recent decisions in context, to examine the
history of the concept of "obscenity," its meaning, the different tests which have
been applied in obscenity cases, and some of the sociological, psychological and con-
stitutional questions inherent in the problem.
HISTORY OF OBSCENITY AS A CRIME
An examination of the history of obscenity in America and England discloses the
importance of the Comstock movement in the United States and the Victorian Age
in England in the evolution of the law dealing with the subject.7 Save for a few
prosecutions for the common law crime of blasphemy which may have incidentally
involved obscenity, the first recorded American prosecution for obscenity was in
Massachusetts in 1821 and involved a book entitled "The Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure." s The first important federal law on the subject was the Comstock Act of
3 The Obscene Publications Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 83. In 1955, the Society of Authors pre-
sented a bill to Parliament [House of Commons Bill 56, 1955] which would have amended
Lord Campbell's Act by requiring the court to consider the general character and dominant effect of
the material in question and its literary or scientific merit, if any, and whether it had had any cor-
rupting effect. Moreover, the court would be required to consider the general character of the person
charged, the nature of his business, and the evidence of any experts called in his behalf. Another bill
to amend Lord Campbell's Act was introduced in 1957. Both bills were referred to a select committee
for consideration and investigation.
4 §22-a of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure (L. 1941, c. 925), as amended 1954 (L.
1954, c. 702), held constitutional in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 77 S. Ct. 1325. (1957).
5 18 U.S.C. §1461, held constitutional in Roth v. United States and Alperts v. California, 77 S.
Ct. 1304. (1957) (hereafter referred to as the Roth and Alperts case).
' Comment and prediction of Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring and dissenting opinion in the
Roth and Alperts case,'77 S. Ct. 1304. 1315. (1957).
7 Judge Curtis Bok in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949), considered the history
of obscenity in an extremely powerful and interesting opinion. The recent book of Nopam[ ST.
JOHN-STEvAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956) is the leading English work on the subject, and the
Autumn, 1955, issue of Law and Contemporary Problems had a symposium on Obscenity and the
Arts.
s Commonwealth v'. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336 (1821). An earlier Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v.
Sharpless, 2 S. & R. 9 (1815), involved a painting representing a man and woman in "imprudent and
indecent posture." It is believed that the book involved in the Massachusetts case is the same one
which was published in England in 1748 under the title of "Fanny Hill", ran through some twenty
editions, and caused its author John Cleland to be summoned before Privy Council where he was
scolded by Lord Granville and granted a pension of £100 on condition that he desist from writing
such books in the future!
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18739 which declared obscene material to be non-mailable matter. Today, federal
statutes not only deny the use of the mails but also forbid the interstate transporta-
tion of obscene material'0 and punish obscene language used on radio broadcasts."
Moreover, all forty-eight states have diverse types of obscenity statutes.
There has been considerable dispute as to whether or not obscenity was a common
law crime. Apparently, it had no independent status at the time of Coke but was re-
garded as a crime by the time of Blackstone, although the cases cited by the latter
in support of the claim that obscenity was a common law crime involve conduct which
might be considered as a nuisance. 2 The case of Rex v. Churl," decided by the King's
Bench in 1727, is often cited as the first definite obscenity case, but it is noteworthy
that there are only a handful of cases before the nineteenth century and they are in-
conclusive as evidence to support the claim that obscenity historically had been a
common law crime.
Why is it that this offense, in any event a Johnny-come-lately to English juris-
prudence, did not achieve importance until mid-nineteenth century? There are two
explanations. First, such sin was within the jurisdiction of religious authority which
did not need nor call for temporal assistance. 4 Church authorities might condemn
the reading of erotic literature as a menace to the soul's salvation and provide their
own effective sanctions. Secondly, and more important, before the nineteenth cen-
tury, reading was by men only!15 In 1788, Dr. Johnson remarked to Boswell that "all
our ladies read now." The habit was only then being acquired bywomen!The diversion
spread, and books came to be read by the family, often aloud. What had been in-
offensive to males had to be cleaned up for mixed company! With the intrusion of
wives and mothers into the world of literature a new concept of obscenity emerged.
What one may unscientifically call a female evangelical urge was engendered;
suffrage, women's rights, and morality in literature became the objects for crusade.
Its ultimate was "podsnappery"--the avoidance of topics which would cause a young
person or female to blush. Not only was pressure exerted for the enactment of laws
but Societies for the Suppression of Vice were organized both in America and England.
Masculine toleration or indifference was superseded by feminine rectitude and an
army of amazons merely awaited the leadership of a Comstock. The concept of ob-
scenity, if not born in the Victorian Age, at least then acquired identity.
During most of this period expurgation and censorship was accomplished on a pri-
9 U.S.C. §1461.
10 18 U.S.C. §1465.
" 18 U.S.C. §1464.
" See ST. JoHN-STEvAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956) Chap. II.
3 2 Str. 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (1727).
1 See American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE, (Tent. Draft No. 6 (1957)), comment upon
§207.10, at page 5. (hereafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 6). ST. JOHN-STEVAs, op. cit. Chap. I, doubts
whether ecclesiastical authorities concerned themselves about obscenity, as sacrilege or blasphemy
was of much greater concern. It may also be noted that originally censorship was directed against
heresy, later against sedition, and finally against obscenity. It was not until the nineteenth century
that there was censorship of obscenity as such. For example when BoccAcIo's Tix DECAMERON fell
under papal ban in 1559 this was not because of its obscenity but because it satirized the clergy, and
when the latter references were removed the Church authorized an expurgated edition.
"s ST. JoUm-STzvAs. op. cil., 25-28.
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vate or administrative level. The first important English case was in 1868 when Lord
Cockburn decided the famous Hicklin case16 and held that "the test of obscenity is
whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is such as to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands
a publication of this sort might fall." The Hicklin test has persisted in England to
this day, has been incorporated into many American statutes,17 and was the basis for
decision in many of the older American cases.'8 In 1913, Judge Learned Hand dis-
approved of the test, 9 in 1933 it was rejected in the Ulysses case,20 and in 1957 re-
pudiated by name by the Supreme Court.2' It is especially obnoxious because of the
questionable assumption that bad behavior follows from exposure to pornography,
because due to its indefiniteness it inevitably makes criminal law a battleground for
conflicting moralities, and since the referrant is an abnormal person rather than a
reasonable man, the mildly suggestive may be regarded as obscene.
An alternative to the "tendency to corrupt" test which has been advanced within
recent years is an adaptation of the clear and present danger test. judge Curtis Bok
in 1949" made an analogy to sedition and free speech and limited obscenity to cases
where there was a reasonable and demonstrable cause to believe that a crime had or
might result from the material in question and thus a causal relation between the
book and criminal behavior had been established. judge Frank, shortly before his
untimely death, likewise expressed preference for some such test.2 The American
Civil Liberties Union has supported this view.' 4 Despite the logical appeal that evil
thoughts are outside the ambit of temporal concern and that it is conduct or the
instigation of conduct that is the law's concern, the clear and present danger test
has the practical defect that it imposes an all but impossible burden of proof upon
the prosecution because there is little if any creditable evidence that pornography
causes criminal conduct. For this reason, perhaps, both the American Law Institute
in its Model Penal Code" and the Supreme Court finally rejected this proposed ap-
proach to the law of obscenity.
Because of the drawbacks to these historical tests of obscenity, the Supreme Court
when for the first time the issue was squarely presented to it, rejected both and
adopted at least in part the test which a month before had been promulgated by the
16 (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360.
" See discussion of this test and a citation of state authorities supporting it, in LOCKHART &
McCLuRE, LITERATURE, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295,
329 (1954).
18 See discussion in United States t. One Book Called "Ulysses". 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
1933).
19 United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
29 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd 72 F.2d 705 (C.A.2, 1934).
"21Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380 (1957) and the Roth and Alperts case, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1311
(1957).
2 Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949), aff'd sub. non,. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum,
166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
2 See concurring opinion in United Stales v. Roth. 237 F.2d 796 at 804 (1956).
24 See Tent. Draft No. 6 at 24.
21 id. at 28.
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Model Penal Code.2 6 Obscene matter is that which appeals to a "prurient interest,"
and "prurient" is held to mean a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or ex-
cretion, which goes beyond the customary limits of candor in description or repre-
sentation of such matters.2 The only judicial precedent in support of such a test,
however, is some general language by Mr. Justice McKenna in the Mutual Filn
case.2
The drafters of the Model Penal Code made a rather convincing argument for the
"prurient interest" test. On the one hand, it is recognized that there is a normal in-
terest in sexual matters for which it should be lawful to provide satisfaction. On the
other, it is also recognized that society may have a legitimate interest in deterring
the deliberate stimulation and exploitation of emotional tensions arising from a con-
flict between social convention and the individual's sex drive. The description or
representation must go substantially beyond customary limits of candor, it is recog-
nized that customs change from time to time and the material in question must be
disapproved by generally observed custom. The purpose is to prevent commerce in
the obscene-the "pandering" of filth." The spotlight is put on the material itself
rather than upon the customer-victim. The predominant appeal of the work as a
whole must be a prurient interest.
Among the possible objections to the "prurient interest" test is the complaint that
it neglects to sufficiently emphasize the importance of judging the work as a whole
and passages in context and the difficulty of determining what are the "customary
limits of candor." The latter most certainly invites captious and arbitrary judgments.
Inevitably, the conclusion will be highly subjective. However, this is a serious ob-
jection to any jury determination of such questions and applies a fortiorari to the
"tendency to corrupt" test which heretofore has prevailed. Only some variation of
the clear and present danger test might obviate such difficulty. As long as we have
the crime of obscenity it is inevitable that some one's notion of morality will be im-
posed upon others and that perhaps such imposition may be that of a vocal minority.
It may be unrealistic to suppose that instructions in terms of "the degree of public
acceptance of the material in this country" will be any more meaningful to a jury
than one in terms of "tendency to corrupt." Moreover, the American Law Institute
has rejected any special privilege for serious artists" although it does recommend
that evidence of literary merit should be admissible"' and excludes dissemination to
institutions or individuals having scientific or other special justification for possessing
such materials."
The difficulty of formulating any test or rules in this area stems in part from the
uncertainty and inadequacy of available psychological materials. Legal scholars
2 The obscenity provision in the Model Penal Code was considered at the May 1957 meeting of
the American'Law Institute and §207.10 was then approved. The court decisions followed a month
later.
27 See comment and explanation of §207.10 in Tent. Draft No. 6 at 29 el seq.
28 Muliil Film Corp v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 230, 242 (1915).
29 Tent. Draft No. 6 at 13 et seq.
30 Tent. Draft No. 6 at 39 et seq
31 §207.10 (2) (c).
32 §207.10 (4) (c).
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have concluded that the research of psychologists neither proves nor disproves the
ex stence of a causal relation between obscenity and criminality or antisocial con-
duct.33 It may be that obscenity may be a substitute for rather than a stimulus to
physical activity. 4 Or, on the other hand, the popular supposition that obscenity
triggers conduct may some day be verified.35 It is also true that to some extent erotic
thoughts are projected to objects and hence obscenity may be largely a subjective
experience so that individuals inclined in that direction will derive sexual stimulation
from whatever is available.36 Havelock Ellis tells of the English schoolmaster who
became excited by the sight of a boy in knickerbockers!17 Due to the unsatisfactory
nature of empirical evidence on the psychological meaning and effect of obscenity,
courts on the one hand might indulge in the assumption that all obscenity statutes
are attempts at thought control and hence objectionable, or on the other continue as
at present to presume a causal relation. A full scale inquiry into the problem by com-
petent scientists might be helpful, although the obstacles to a controlled test or isola-
tion of the pertinent factors appears to be an insurmountable barrier. Psychologists
may find it impossible to reach a consensus.
Also disturbing to those who compose the literati is the fact that even under the
Penal Code test there may be a conviction notwithstanding great artistic competence
where it is concluded that the main appeal is to prurient interest." Literary merit
will not save the author. He may fare no better under the new test than he did under
the "tendency to corrupt" test. There is no exemption for "old and standard works." 9
Some may feel that this is too high a price to pay for a law which at best is based
upon a shaky premise of social concern. By hindsight we may see that the excesses
and abuses of the censors of the past, the prosecution and persecution of many of our
greatest modern artists, is the greater immorality!"0 If any obscenity law or test is
3 See Mr. justice Harlan's opinion in the Roth and Alperts case, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1318 (1957), and
Judge Jerome Frank's concurring opinion in United States v. Roth, (C.A.2, 1956) 237 F.2d 796. Profes-
sors Lockhart and McClure, however, take a stronger position that there is a lack of causal relation
between obscenity and misconduct. See their article, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 LAw AND CONTEM-
PORARY PRoBLEmS 587 at 596. The work most frequently cited is that by DR. JAHODA, Summary of
Report of Dr. Jahoda and Associates, THE IMPA Ac or LITERATURE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL DIscussioN
Or SOMEn AsSUMPTIONS IN THE CENSORSHIP DEBATE (1954). Also cited by judge Frank is FEDER,
Comc Boox REGULATION (Uni. of Calif., Bureau of Pub. Adm., 1955 Legislative Problems No. 2).
34 See KA' AN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND His OrFENsES 360 (1954).
5 DR. FREDERIC WERTHAM: in his book SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1954) makes the strongest
case in support of the popular supposition but he may engender more heat than light on the subject.
36 D. H. Lawrence, who might be regarded as a practical authority on the subject of obscenity, has
said that what is pornography to one man is the laughter of genius to another. Quoted by ST. JOHN-
STEVAs, op. cit. at page 2. The highly subjective character of sensualism is perhaps illustrated by
HuysmANs' AGAINST =ra GRAIN, the book which supposedly corrupted Dorian Gray.
7 Quoted by ST. JOHN-STEvAS, op. cit., at page 1, in support of the thesis that obscenity resides
exclusively not in the thing contemplated but in the mind of the contemplating person-a sort of
Pavlov's dog approach. See also note 63 post.
38 Tent. Draft No. 6 at 42.
39 id. at 40.
40 The depressing harrassment of great artists is recounted in ST. JOHN-STEVAS' OBSCEITY AND
m LAw and a fascinating account of a recent English trial is described by WARBURG, Onward and
Upward With the Arts, THE NEW YoRKER, April 20, 1957, describing the author's experiences in the
case of R. V. Maryin Secker Warburg, Ltd., (1954) 2 All Rng. 683 (C.C.C.). An interesting procedure
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accepted, to that extent freedom of expression is impaired. In order to have creativity,
at least some offense to good taste must be tolerated. To limit an artist to the "cus-
tomary limits of candor in description or representation" is to restrict his subject
matter, make him a candidate for martyrdom or a victim of harrassment. Non-artists
impose these conditions.
There is also considerable futility in the application of obscenity laws. The "wet
paint" philosophy of the public, the commercial value of a "banned in Boston"
interdict, the added spice that proscription lends, tend to defeat the avowed purpose
of the Comstockian crusaders. In the final analysis, education, not expurgation, is
the condition precedent to decency and morality. Good taste cannot be legislated nor
imposed by fiat. It is the responsibility of family, church, and school to inculcate
decency, and such a responsibility implies affirmative action by precept and example.
At best, obscenity laws are a negative approach and an attempt to shore up the
failure of those having primary responsibility.
RECENT SuREmnEM COiRT DEcIsIONs
We turn now to the recent Supreme Court decisions. Perhaps the key Justice in
these cases was Mr. Justice Frankfurter who wrote the majority opinion in Kingsley
Books, Inc. v. Brow14' and helped to make up the narrow majority in the Roth and
Alperts cases. 2 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it will be remembered, dissented in Winters
v. New York,4" concurred in The Miracle decision,44 and wrote the opinion in Butler v.
Michigan." Thus, his prior record indicated that although he regarded "sacrilage"
as too vague and indefinite a term for a movie censorship statute he did not feel the
same way about the language of the New York horror or crime magazine act. Yet he
is opposed to the Hicklin technique employed by Michigan which had the effect of
reducing the level of lawful discourse to that fit for children. For the past few years,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has been the Court's leading proponent of laissez faire for
the legislative branch and the leading opponent of the "preferred rights" theory of
the First Amendment freedoms. He is willing to presume the constitutionality of
legislation even where there is an abridgement of the basic freedoms guaranteed by
has evolved under a new French statute (a law of 25 September 1946, discussed by ST. JOh'o-STEvAs,
op. cit., at 249) which permits a review of old decisions condemning literary works. Under this pro-
cedure BAUDELAIRE'S LEs FLEURS Du MAL was vindicated in 1949. The list of great artists who have
been subjected to the censor's wrath reads like a Who's Who of the literary world. However, in many
instances, obscure writings were skyrocketed to the "best seller" class due to the activities of censors.
For example, Bradlauigh v. R. (1878), 3 Q.B.D. 607, increased the sales of an obscure pseudo-scien-
tific book from a few hundred a year to over one hundred and twenty thousand. ST. Jons-STEVAS,
op. cil., at 74.
4' 77 S. Ct. 1325. (1957).
42 77 S. Ct. 1304. (1957).
43 333 U. S. 507, 520 (1948). Mr. Justice Frankfurter was impressed by the 60-year-age of the New
York statute and the fact that some twenty odd states had similar statutes and argued that there
was no possible excuse for or merit to publications which "massed" crime and horror material.
44 Bursyn v. Wilso, 343 U. S. 495, 506 (1952). Mr. Justice Frankfurter inserted a lengthy appen-
dix showing the many meanings of "sacrilege."
45 352 U. S. 380 (1957).
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the Constitution due to his perspective as to the function of judicial review under a
tri-party system. His position in the Flag Salute cases46 illustrates his approach.
In the Kingsley Books case, a five-four decision, Mr. Justice Frankfurter upheld
the constitutionality of the New York act which authorized a summary ex parte
procedure before a magistrate which might culminate in a temporary restraining
order against the sale of books of an "indecent character" which were "obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting" and which after prompt hearing might
result in a permanent state-wide injunction against sale and distribution and an
order for their destruction. The appellants did not claim that the books involved
were not obscene, nor did they assail the legislation insofar as it outlawed obscenity.
Sole reliance was placed upon the contention that the procedure was per se uncon-
stitutional as an undue restraint upon freedom of the press under the doctrine of
Near v. Minnesota.4 1 With the issue thus narrowed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter distin-
guished the two cases on the ground that Near v. Minnesota truly involved a prior
restraint as future publications were enjoined due to past defamation, whereas the
New York law in all cases operated on publications already issued and restraint
impinged only after a finding of obscenity. Moreover, since New York might consti-
tutionally convict the defendant under a criminal statute, an auxiliary means of
dealing with the matter should be available. The legislature was entitled to a choice
of remedies. In any event, the defendant was better off under the New York procedure
since he had advance warning and would not end up in jail unless he defied the
injunction.
This rationale was unacceptable to the Chief Justice, and Justices Douglas, Black,
and Brennan. Chief Justice Warren objected to a procedure which he felt "savors
too much of book burning" and argued that it is the conduct of the individual that
should be judged, not the quality of art or literature, and that the New York statute
did involve a prior restraint. Mr. Justice Brennan felt that the absence of a right to
a jury trial on the issue of obscenity was a fatal defect. Mr. Justice Douglas con-
demned the statute because its summary features permitted a prior restraint ex parte
before even a hearing was held and because an injunction issued in one part of the
state would be applicable to possibly different circumstances in another part of the
state, in effect "making the censor supreme."
46MinnersVitle Sclwol District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued in each case
that the Supreme Court should not interfere with the authority of a local school board, that the
question was one of legislative policy peculiarly within its competence. Mr. Justice Jackson writing
for the majority in the Barnette case pointed out that the very purpose of the Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy and to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and that the Court alone could effectively safeguard such funda-
mental rights. The so-called "preferred rights" theory, i.e., that the burden of justifying infringe-
ments upon First Amendment freedoms rests upon proponents of such legislation, is discussed in
MASON, HARLANq FISKE STONE 513, 556-57 (1956).
4 283 U. S. 697 (1931), holding that a statute which permitted a court to enjoin as a "public
nuisance" a magazine or newspaper which had published "malicious, scandalous or defamatory"
material was an unconstitutional abridgement of the free press guaranteed by the First Amendment
as read into the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. In 1925,
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, had assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment might incorporate
free speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
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To those who had been following the Supreme Court's decisions in this area, the
Kingsley Book case came as a "shocker." The Miracle decision and the per curium
opinions" thereafter had indicated that censorship as a sanction was unconstitu-
tional and that Near v. Minnesota was being extended rather than limited. However,
when Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in The Miracle case is examined,
it is evident that censorship and free speech was not the problem so far as he was
concerned, rather, the defect in the New York act was that "sacrilegious" was such
an uncertain term that it could not pass the requirement of definiteness imposed by
due process. It had no settled meaning, hence it did not sufficiently apprise those bent
on obedience of the law of what may be foreseen to be illicit by the law-enforcing
authority. Moreover the particular statute did not have a sufficient provision for
judicial review.
It is difficult to see how the amorphous term "obscene" has any more of a settled
meaning than the term "sacrilegious." But Mr. Justice Frankfurter overcame this
difficulty by pointing to the definition of obscenity which was adopted in the com-
panion Roth and Alperts case in terms of an appeal to "prurient interests." As so
defined, the words of the New York statute were sufficiently clear and definite. The
fact that this definition was formulated retroactively upon appeal, was not contained
in the statute, nor used by the trial court, and as a practical matter gave no fair or
sure guide to a possible offender, was immaterial. It is obvious that under all of the
various tests of obscenity the ultimate judgment becomes a matter of degree except
in the most extreme cases. The "prurient interest" test admittedly and avowedly
turns on a matter of degree-whether the "predominant" appeal is to prurient tastes.
Realistically, therefore, it is evident that the due process requirement of definiteness
is being sacrificed because it is felt that the public interest in suppressing trash is
more important than advance notice of what the law permits and condemns. It is
difficult to reconcile the Justice's approach in these cases.
The alarming element of the Kingsley Books case, however, is the validation of
the procedure authorized by the New York statute. Not only is the preliminary
hearing ex pare but there is no right to a jury trial. Books may be destroyed. Despite
the venerable nature of equity procedure and despite the historical use of such pro-
cedure in obscenity cases, it seems barbaric today. True, Lord Campbell's Act estab-
lished this technique and the statutes of several states authorize it," but nonetheless
recent experience with "book burning" has been such that it seems anachronistic to
tolerate such an "auxiliary means" of dealing with the problem even though it may
have to run the gamut of judicial review. It is ironic that Mr. Justice Frankfurter
seems to have forgotten the significant contribution of Professor Frankfurter in
48 See for example: Gelling v. Texas, 343 U. S. 960 (1952); Superior Films v. Dept. of Education,
346 U.S. 587 (1954); Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Holmby Productions
v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955). These cases certainly warranted the inference that possibly all censor-
ship was unconstitutional and suggested that the Court would permit the use of a criminal sanction
against obscenity only within a narrow area. See, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
interpretation of these cases in Hallmark Prodictions, Inc. v. Carroll, 284 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584
(1956).
49 For example, see Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 48 (1935) (Supp. 1953) §219, and Mass. Ann. Laws c. 272
(1956) §28. The Colorado law adopts injunction procedure and the Massachusetts act permits an
action against the offending book.
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criticizing the labor injunction and the arguments he made against the comparable
procedure he now finds unobjectionable." It is difficult to believe that this decision
will stand and if it revives or encourages censorship the situation may become
intolerable.
Although the Kingsley Books case may have been the most shocking of the June
decisions, the Roth and Alperts case have a wider affect upon the law of obscenity.
At the outset, it should be noted that the facts of the cases before the Supreme Court
were such that if any obscenity convictions or restraints are to be sustained, the
situations at hand warranted such treatment. Both cases involved commercial pedlars
of erotic material, "pandering" to prurient interests. The material in question was
not the product of a serious artist dealing with the seamy side of life. Mr. Justice
Brennan wrote the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan concurred as to the Alperts
case but dissented as to Roth, Chief Justice Warren wrote a concurring opinion, and
Justices Douglas and Black dissented.
The majority opinion established the rule that obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech and press and that a dichotomy exists between
obscenity and material having "social importance." Thus, obscenity joins "fighting
words" 51 and "race libel"'12 as being outside the pale of constitutional concern. But
having indulged in this Linnean technique with a resulting hardening of the cate-
gories, Mr. Justice Brennan proceeded to indulge in "disarming generalizations" and
neglected to give any satisfactory explanation as to how to accomplish the procrustean
feat of fitting individual cases into one class or the other. He did, however, indorse
the "prurient interest" test but then approved of jury instructions couched in terms
of the old "tendency to corrupt" test which had been expressly rejected by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code."
It is difficult to tell for sure just what the majority opinion means. There was no
need for going beyond the immediate facts at hand. If it had been noted that those
facts established that the materials in question were obscene under the broadest
definition of obscenity and that commercial purveyors of obscenity had no claim for
free press protection, and that the convictions must stand because under either the
"tendency to corrupt" or the "prurient interest" test the material was obscene, but
that the latter test was determinitive, considerable difficulty would have been avoided.
But the opinion is drafted in such a way that it appears that there is an indulgence
in word magic, a personification of labels, and the crucial issue as to why the particular
material is properly classified as obscene is ignored. It is also confusing to indorse and
adopt a definition and then not to comment upon a contrary definition which the
trial court employed in instructing the jury. If one looks at the facts of these cases
the result seems reasonable, but the rationale and obiter dicta muddy the waters. The
50 Cf. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930), which bitterly criticizes
equity procedure in labor cases and was responsible for legislative reform in this area.
-1 Chaplinesky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
'
2 Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), sustaining the Illinois group libel law (§224a of the
Ill. Criminal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1949, c. 38, Div. 1, §471) making it a misdemeanor to expose the
citizens of any race, color, creed, or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive
of breach of the peace or riots.
1s Tent. Draft No. 6 19-22.
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test of obscenity has been determined, but its implementation and its application to
concrete cases, remains uncertain.
Another consequence of the Roth and Alperts cases is that the Supreme Court
may receive a flood of cases involving the classification problem of whether particular
material falls within the "obscene" category or is a constitutionally protected ex-
pression. It remains to be seen whether there will be few or many platypuses, centaurs,
and mermaids which are difficult to pigeonhole, and whether there is justification for
the fear that "it may result in a loosening of the tight reins which state and federal
courts should hold upon the enforcement of obscenity statutesl"6 The latter predic-
tion may be well founded. It is reasonable to assume that many well-organized groups
will seize upon these opinions as a stimulus to greater efforts to impose censorship in
varying forms.
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion is of interest because of the distinction which he
makes between free speech and press under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
He concludes that the prohibition against abridgement of free speech and press by
the federal government is broader and more exacting than that against state activity
imposed by virtue of reading freedom of expression into "liberty" in the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause. Diversified treatment of the problem of obscenity
may be desirable and hence there should be greater leeway accorded to the states. He
feels that even though a causal relation between obscenity and criminal or immoral
behavior may not have been proved to exist, that it is a proper function for the state
legislature to take whichever side it chooses so long as the matter is in dispute. He
too rejects the "tendency to corrupt" test but contends that "it is no answer to say,
as the Court does, that obscenity is not protected speech. The point is that this
statute, as here construed, defines obscenity so widely that it encompasses matters
which might very well be protected speech."55 Mr. justice Douglas makes the same
criticism of the majority opinion, and in addition expresses a preference for the clear
and present danger approach to the problem and objects to the "prurient interest"
test saying that, "Like the standards applied by the trial judges below, that standard
does not require any nexus between the literature which is prohibited and action
which the legislation can regulate or prohibit. Under the First Amendment, that
standard is no more valid than those which the courts below adopted." 6 Freedom of
expression may be abridged "only if so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an
inseparable part of it."
It is interesting to note that, contemporaneously with the withdrawal of obscenity
from the purview of freedom of expression, the Supreme Court has extended such
freedom in the area of sedition." On the surface it would look as if there were a greater
public interest in curbing political heresy than the morally indecent and that if
seditious utterances are within the scope of constitutional protection and not a
separate category the same result should be reached in the case of obscenity. The
Court's answer to this contention is that political utterances have some redeeming
51 Mr. Justice Harlan, in Roth and Alperts case, Yates v. United States, 77 S. Ct. 1064. (1957).
65 id. at 1321.
56id. at 1324.
51 See for example O'Connor v. United States, Yates v. United States, 77 S. Ct. 1064. (1957).
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"social importance" but that smut does not. The trouble with this distinction is
that obviously some works or objects which under the several tests might be classified
as "obscene" in fact do have "social importance" in the world of art and literature
and ideas. Their social import may not be in the area of political science but rather
in the areas of literature, sociology and psychology. The difficulty may be how to sep-
arate the utterly worthless from that which has value and who is to make the choice.
The Supreme Court decisions are not too helpful as to this. Further, from the stand-
point of the legislature, there is a serious drafting problem because an obscenity
statute may on the one hand be so definite and restricted in its application as to be
substantially ineffectual, or so broad and vague as to leave improper discretion to
law enforcement officials. For this reason, considerable deference may be paid to the
legislative product.
It has only been within the recent past that there has been serious doubt as to the
constitutionality of obscenity statutes. The Fourteenth Amendment but recently
was held to incorporate freedom of expression. su Much territory remains unexplored.
It will be interesting to see the extent to which statutes and ordinances are drafted
or redrafted in the light of the "prurient interest" test and whether the example of
the Model Penal Code is followed in other particulars. For example, the Code excludes
private dissemination to adults, not for gain, from its purview. Most statutes at
present probably cover this. 9 Obscenity ordinarily is to be adjudged by adult stand-
ards, but the character of the audience for which the material was designed may be
taken into consideration.6" State laws differ on this score. The defendant may show
the artistic, literary, scientific, educational or other merit, the degree of public ac-
ceptance of the material in this country, the lack of any appeal to prurient taste in
the advertising or promotion of the material, and expert testimony on the various
factors may be offered, according to the Code"1 although these matters are not cov-
ered by existing statutes.
In addition to the problem of renovating existing statutes to bring them into accord
with the Supreme Court decisions, it is to be anticipated that many problems will
confront law enforcement people. Private vigilante action-organized boycotts ot
certain books, magazines ormovies, together with pressure exerted upon local officials
to adopt a group's notion or list of what is decent or obscene may continue, although
the constitutionality of reasonably drawn statutes should supersede "self-help." 62
The criminal sanction may function more liberally and be more tolerant than the
controls exercised by private boycott. Logically, there is less excuse for extralegal
private action since the Supreme Court decisions, but in all probability the cases will
only rekindle the fervor of the censors.
58 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
19 Tent. Draft No. 6 at 15-16.
6o 'rent. Draft No. 6 at 36 et seq.
61 Tent. Draft No. 6 at 29 el seq.
62 The possibility that there may be tort liability due to private boycotts is beyond the scope of
this discussion. However, such cases as Advance Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N. Y.
79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946), Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 972 P.2d 867 (1946),
and Watch Tower Bible Tract Society v. Daugherty, 337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147 (1940), indicate a possi-
bility of liability at least if a court concludes there was a lack of "justification" for the interference.
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CONCLUSION
The fact that basically we are dealing with a matter as nebulous as good taste and
with a concept which differs from time to time and place to place means that manners
and morals are inexorably interwoven so that it is difficult to separate candor from
shame.0 The fact that daily newspapers and periodicals are replete with erotic
stimuli yet escape prosecution, that the "classics" and the Bible itself contain much
which may fairly be regarded as "obscene," and that the ubiquitous "dirty story"
has sufficient vitality to withstand the dictates of either law or good taste, points to
the ultimate futility of trying to legislate decency.6 For those looking for sex stimuli,
reminders are everywhere. The criminal sanction sometimes is a rather sorry weapon
and a century of experience indicates that it is of slight utility in a war against sin.
There are other means of social control. The force of public opinion, private condem-
nation, the ridicule and derision of literary and other critics, and the influence of
religious groups, in reality, may have far more effect upon the dissemination of
obscenity than criminal trials which publicize the matter and whet curiosity. An
affirmative approach which encourages a high regard for the moral and the decent
may accomplish more than a prohibition.
That the problem of obscenity is not merely a local phenomenon is shown by the
fact that most civilized countries and perhaps all cultures attempt some control of
what locally is regarded as obscene or shameful. 5 Societies differ, however, in the
63 For an interesting short discussion of obscenity, see LA BARRE, Obscenity: An AntlhropologiCal
Appraisal, 20 LAW AND Coi=rEmsp. PROBLEMS 533 (1955), where he concludes: "In our society, it
must be insisted, obscenity inheres in a definable list of things that may not necessarily be pro-
hibited elsewhere: in the use of tabooed artistic representations or words, in nudity of certain parts
of the body, and in the performance of publically prohibited acts .... Any 'obscenity' involved is
the artifact of our own cultural projections. Indeed, in other contexts, the shoe may be on the other
foot, and we may be accused of obscenity where none, certainly, is intended." He points out that
among Moslem women, it may be more immodest to expose the face than the body, to the Chinese
a woman's artificially deformed foot may be obscene, that a Haida woman would be embarrassed to
be caught without her lower lip plug, that the Japanese have erotized the nape of a woman's neck,
and that the Tahitians who eat only in private may copulate in public.
& Dr. Kinsey's studies indicate that printed materials are an infrequent source of sex information
and a 1938 survey conducted by the New York Bureau of Social Hygiene revealed that of the women
interviewed as to what they found sexually stimulating, 95 of the 405 who replied answered "books"
and 208 said "men"l Quoted by ST. JoHN-STEvAs, op. cit., at 196 e seq. The studies by the Gluecks
also indicate that written obscenity had a negligible effect upon juvenile delinquency for the simple
reason that typically but few juveniles read. See LOCKHART AND McCLRE, Obscenity it; the Courts,
20 LAW AND CONTEM. PROBLEMS 587 at 596.
65 Apparently New Mexico is the only state which has no general criminal obscenity statute, but
it authorizes cities to prohibit the dissemination of the obscene. Tent. Draft No. 6 at 5. "Every
known human society exercises some explicit censorship over behavior relating to the human body,
especially as that behavior involves or may involve sex." MEAD, SEX AN CENSORSHIP IN CON-
TEMPORARY SocIETY, in NEW WORLD WRrrnIo (3rd MENTOR SELEcTION) 7 (1953). The Geneva
Conference of the League of Nations in 1923 resulted in an agreement signed by some forty countries
which promised to regulate traffic in obscenity, the World Postal Convention of 1924 resulted in a
further agreement. At the present time, under United Nations auspices, there is an international
agreement signed by over 50 nations, including the United States. Agreement for the Suppression of
the Circulation of Obscene Publications, 37 Stat. 1511; Treaties in Force 209 (U. S. Dept. State
October 31, 1956).
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form of sanction employed and in whether it is regarded as a spiritual or temporal
matter. In a democratic society which is nourished by a pluralism of ideas, a criminal
sanction against obscenity has serious drawbacks because freedom of expression is
correspondingly impaired. Since the Victorian Age our courts and legislatures have
tried to strike a balance between freedom of expression and the protection of decency
and morality. At best they have fashioned an uneasy compromise satisfying to neither
adversary in this continuing struggle. Temporary advantages have been won and
lost but the contest has not been concluded. Courts and legislatures, council chambers
and police station, are not the only scenes of battle. Private vendors are subjected to
group pressures too. It might be said that the ghost of Anthony Comstock is quite
active these days. Whether his spirit of censorship is a "load" or a "lode" depends on
the prospector and what he seeks.
